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ABSTRACT
Objective The development of genomic approaches to prenatal testing such as whole genome and exome sequencing
offers the potential for a better understanding of prenatal structural anomalies in the fetus and ultimately for improved
patient care and more informed reproductive decision making. In addition to the scientific and clinical challenges of
achieving this, the introduction of new reproductive technologies also presents a number of ethical problems. The
successful and appropriate development and introduction of prenatal genomics into clinical practice require these
problems to be identified, understood and carefully analysed in the development of models of good ethical practice.
Method We conducted a critical review of the existing literature on ethical issues in prenatal genomics.
Results We identified and discussed five areas of particular concern: valid consent, management and feed-back of
information, responsibilities of health professionals, priority setting and resources and duties towards the future child.
Conclusion There is a need for further discussion of the issues we have outlined here, and we hope that this brief
summary of ethical arguments in the literature encourages researchers, clinicians, patients and scientists to engage in
further discussion of these and other important issues raised by prenatal genomics. © 2017 The Authors. Prenatal
Diagnosis published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of invasive testing for chromosomal
anomalies in the mid-1960s, costs have dropped and safety
and accuracy have increased greatly.1 The development of
new technologies such as whole genome microarrays with
greater resolution enables the identification of still more
anomalies with shorter turnaround times.2 Despite this
progress, however, diagnosis is still only possible in around
40% of dysmorphic fetuses.3,4 Prenatal whole genome and
exome sequencing (WGES) offer the potential to provide
diagnoses in cases where this is currently not possible.5 A good
illustration of this potential is offered by the Prenatal
Assessment of Genomes and Exomes project, which is analysing
samples from 1000 parent–fetus trios in which structural
abnormalities have been detected.6 The study is showing that
prenatal genomic testing has the potential to increase diagnosis
rates significantly over existingmethods, and as techniques and
approaches to analysis and interpretation improve, it is likely
that this will improve still further, offering women and couples
the opportunity to make better informed decisions about
current or future pregnancies, and also ultimately informing
the development of therapeutic interventions.4,7
The development of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT),
whichmakes possible the analysis of cell-free fetal DNA present
in a sample of maternal blood (rather than through an invasive
prenatal test), offers further important benefits.8 NIPT can be
carried out earlier in pregnancy than existing invasive tests,
and results are more accurate, whichmeans invasive tests, with
risk of miscarriage, are required less frequently.9 This also has
the advantage that women who would not wish to undergo an
invasive test but would accept a non-invasive alternative would
be able to receive information about their pregnancy that
would not otherwise be available to them.10
Although the use of WGES in NIPT is in its early stages,4,11 it is
likely that it will soon be more widely available making it
possible to know a great deal more about the genetics of a fetus
from a maternal blood sample.12 This information will not only
provide diagnosis but identify genetic variants indicating
carrier status, late-onset diseases and also, inevitably,
information about variant that cannot currently be interpreted.
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As we will discuss below, the potential availability of each of
these kinds of information raises important ethical questions.13
ETHICAL ISSUES
Notwithstanding their important potential benefits, the use of
genomic approaches to prenatal testing, particularly when
combined with NIPT, raises a number of ethical questions that
require careful consideration.14 Many of these have similarities
with those discussed in the context of prenatal genetics.15–18
However, in the context of prenatal genomics such issues arise
in new ways, dimensions and in combinations not previously
encountered.13,19
Achieving valid consent
Some of the most important ethical challenges in prenatal
genomics relate to ensuring that patients have a good
understanding of the implications of such testing before
deciding whether or not to proceed. It is clearly important for
genetic counsellors and professionals in fetal medicine to
provide information in a way that is manageable and
comprehensible.20 Clear communication about expectations
and worries by adequately trained professionals are key.21 This
is easier to say than to achieve, however, and its practical
implementation will inevitably be difficult inmany cases. There
are several reasons for this. Some are to do with the complexity
of the information involved and of the interpretation of results.
Even where the result is agreed to be of clinical significance, its
implications are likely to be difficult to explain and understand.
This means that even in the most straightforward of cases, valid
consent and the effective explanation of the relevance of
findings may be difficult to achieve.
Still greater complexity arises from the fact that even where a
variant is known to be significant, it is often not possible to
know with certitude, in the prenatal context, whether the child
will be affected by the disease. In many cases, moreover,
notwithstanding the important progress being made in the
field, much of the information resulting from genomic tests
cannot yet be interpreted: the implications of genetic variants
are often difficult to determine, and it is often unclear if a
change in the genetic sequence is associated with an increased
risk of a disease. Finally, the fact that sequencing can produce
information (also of differing degrees of certainty with regard
to the data interpretation) beyond what is relevant to the
condition (the structural abnormality, say) under investigation
adds a further layer of difficulty.
Against this background, a particularly important question is
how much information about each of these possibilities needs to
be provided at the time of consent and what levels of
understanding are required for such consent (or refusal of
consent) to be valid? The recent Montgomery ruling in the UK
suggests that the threshold for information giving should be the
information that this particular patient wants (complemented by
consideration of what a prudent patient in this position might be
expected to want).22 But how in the context of prenatal genomics
ought this to be interpreted? In clinical genetics, a great deal of
emphasis has tended to be placed on the notion of ‘consent as a
process of communication’23,24 in which ‘both clinicians and
patients are seen as bringing information and values to the
discussion’ and working together to agree on the information
relevant to the patient.25 Clarke23 and Pinxten24 suggest that
consent should be a ‘communicative process that is consent-
in-action’ and an ‘opportunity to discuss the return of results in
advance’ [24, p. 273], rather than a legalistic debate about consent
forms [23, p.27]. Whilst of great value, however, this kind of
conversation might be said to presuppose rather than provide an
answer to the question of howmuch andwhat kind of information
should be discussed, and as well as that of what constitutes best
informational practice in consent to prenatal genomics.
Given that the concern with valid consent arises from
recognition of the value of patient autonomy, it is noteworthy
that it has sometimes been argued that in that giving parents,
all available information may lead to ‘information overload
and frustrate, rather than serve the aim of autonomous
choice’[26, p.660]. This has sometimes been taken to justify
‘generic consent’ in which ‘an informed decision does not
require individuals to be provided with all the information
relevant to the decision in question […].’[27, p.1450–1451].
The argument here is that professionals should provide
sufficient, yet filtered information to avoid information
overload or ‘misinformed consent’.28 Elias and Annas28 argue
that genetic counsellors and other professionals involved such
as obstetricians should explain possible risks and problems
using generic examples without however specifying all possible
outcomes. One’s first reaction to this model is likely to be that
it is outdated and unduly paternalistic in the post-Montgomery
era. Nonetheless, it is clearly true that even a strongly
autonomy-driven, patient-centred approach to information
giving in prenatal genomics is going to need to involve the
making of some prior decisions by health professionals about
what information is to be offered and how. This suggests that
a degree of paternalism is unavoidable.
Managing and feeding back information
As indicated earlier, one of the most pressing practical ethical
issues in prenatal genomics concerns the question of what
information should be returned, to whom, by whom and
when? Most discussions concern questions regarding the
return of information about conditions that are preventable
or treatable – ‘actionable’– conditions that are not actionable
but clinically relevant or regarding the return of information
about genetic variants with uncertain significance.
There is an emerging consensus in the ethics
literature24,29,30,31,31 and professional guidelines29 that all data
that are believed to be clinically ‘actionable’ should be fed back
to patients or participants. This consensus is supported by
empirical data showing that most people wish to receive
information about those data whether it concerns the
condition under investigation or an unexpected, incidental
secondary finding.30–32 In the context of reproductive
medicine, however, the concept of ‘actionability’ is likely to
prove contested and value-laden. Although some genomic
variants are clearly defined as actionable, this is not always
the case for all genomic variants with the potential to be
actionable. In the prenatal context it is often difficult to
determine whether a variant will affect the resulting child if
the pregnancy were to be continued. Moreover, the question
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of whether a finding in prenatal testing is actionable is unlikely
to be solely a scientific or clinical one. It is at least in part a
matter of value and tied to questions of what is or is not a
reasonable ground for termination of pregnancy and these
are questions about which patients are likely to have their
own views.
Moving beyond the question of what is or is not actionable,
there is also much debate about the return of results which
are clinically significant but ‘not directly actionable’ in the
prenatal or paediatric context, such as those relating to adult-
onset diseases.24,33,34 A study by Kalynchuk et al.35 has shown
that although information about adult-onset diseases has the
potential to trigger anxiety, the majority of parents still wish
to be informed about such results whether the disease is
treatable or not in order to make future pregnancy or other
health decisions. Drawing upon his long experience in clinical
genetics, Clarke calls for caution, however. He argues that
parental knowledge about an otherwise healthy child’s risk of
an adult-onset condition can sometimes lead parents to treat
the child in ways that are harmful or overly restrictive: labelling
the child as an ‘ill’ or ‘vulnerable’. In such cases, he argues,
knowledge has the potential to be a burden both for the
parents and for the child.23 Clearly, there is a need for careful
thinking here. Another consideration that needs to be factored
in is the fact that information from the fetus may be relevant to
the parents themselves. If the testing reveals, for example, a
BRCA mutation, the woman might benefit from screening
and prophylactic surgery.
When it comes to information of uncertain significance,
there are those who argue that data should not be returned
even if patients would want this.24,33 This view is particularly
strong in research settings where the focus is on generalizable,
population-wide knowledge rather than on clinical treatment
and decision making for an individual patient.30,36 In some
cases, the argument is made that the risk of misunderstanding
the meaning of genetic variants with uncertain significance
can generate unnecessary anxiety among tested persons.37,38
Yet, it is important to note that several studies provide
evidence that many participants would with to receive all
genetic information relating to them, even that which is of
uncertain significance. It appears that in some cases, such
participants would prefer to be informed so that they can
request and receive follow-up from a genetic professional
when more information about the variation is available, or
participate in research.39 O0 Daniel and Hara point out that
rather than generating unnecessary anxiety, offering
participants the opportunity to receive all their genetic
information, if they wish, may help building trust between
the participants and those who offer such tests.40 Providing
such information would inevitably present important demands
on health resources, however, which itself raises important
ethical questions. The opportunity costs of doing this would
need to be carefully considered in any decision about which
policy to adopt. It may be that this could be justified in cases
where the variant of uncertain significance has a high chance
of being pathogenic, and regular follow-up will be important.
There is now agreement that information produced in
clinical genomics should usually only be fed back where the
patient has given consent for this. Much of this consensus
emerged from the controversy following the publication in
2013 by the American College of Medical Genetics and
Genomics of recommendations proposing that the feeding
back of findings relating to mutations in 56 genes should be
non-optional.41 The American College of Medical Genetics
and Genomics later revised their recommendations in line with
guidelines elsewhere to acknowledge the importance of patient
choice.42 Quite apart from the issue of respect for autonomy,
Hall, Hallowell and Zimmern43 argue that the careful judging
of benefits and harms needed calls for respect for parents’ or
patients’ preferences and hence for their involvement.
One situation in which this likely to prove difficult is in
relation to the possible or actual identification of misattributed
paternity, where this is of clinical significance. What are the
responsibilities of health professionals towards the woman,
her partner(s) or the future child? Hercher and Jamal44 argue
that ‘nondisclosure violates the norms of truthfulness and
transparency that people have come to expect in medical
settings. If discovered – and [in the genomic era] it is far more
likely than ever before to be discovered – it will raise ethical
and legal challenges.’ Lucassen and Parker45 also argue that
the possibility of such information should be discussed in
pre-test counselling or when seeking consent. They argue that
not informing the couple would be ‘unjustifiably paternalistic’.
The implementation of any such policy would, however,
require great sensitivity and would itself present a number of
challenges.
Responsibilities of health professionals
In addition to those discussed earlier, prenatal genomics
presents important questions about the nature and scope of
the responsibilities of health professionals to patients and
families. Some of the most important of these arise out of the
fact that current uses of prenatal genomics produce a great
deal of information of uncertain significance whose meaning
will likely become apparent over time as knowledge improves.
In some cases, this will mean that diagnoses will be possible
where this was not previously achievable. Is there in such
situations a responsibility for health professionals and health
systems to store and reanalyse data in the light of new
knowledge? If such data are stored, is there a responsibility to
recontact patients including any children? Clarke23 describes
WGES data as a ‘lifetime resource’, but what are the obligations
that this implies, and upon whom do such obligations fall?
A question of particular importance concerns the
responsibilities to any child who results from a pregnancy in
which genomic testing has been undertaken as he or she
reaches maturity. Is there an obligation to inform the child
about the test and its results? When should this happen? Is this
the responsibility of parents, of health professionals or of some
combination of the two? Thinking more broadly still, what are
the obligations of health professionals (and families?) to act
where information resulting from prenatal genomic test is of
relevance and potential benefit to members of the patient’s
wider family? Should such information be treated as personal,
confidential? Or should it be available for the care and
treatment of other family members?46
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Priority setting and resources
All answers to the questions mentioned previously will have
resource implications. More work is needed on the economic
evaluation of genomics – ‘the real costs for the whole sequencing
workflow, including data management and analysis, remain
unknown’.47 It is clear, however, that the costs of data analysis,
interpretation and curation are going to be significant – as are
the costs of clinical time required to discuss findings with
patients.24 This will remain the case even if the lower costs of
sequencing mean that not all data need to be kept in expensive
long-term storage.23 In any publically funded health system, limits
will have to be placed on the availability of prenatal genomics, and
difficult decisions will need to be made about how to prioritise
resources. Rogowski et al.48 argue that the criteria to be considered
in order to justify the allocation of healthcare resources to genetic
diagnostic testing should be the availability of effective treatment,
the benefit of the diagnosis for the patient or the public welfare,
the need of a diagnosis to facilitate decision-making or the
importance of the testing for research. But how are these different
criteria to be judged against each other?
Those who are not offered genomic testing by the public
sector but who nevertheless wish to receive their genomic
information can, if they have the resources to do so, turn to
commercial direct-to-consumer companies. This raises not
only issues of equity (where those who get access are those
who are able to pay) but also important issues about the
regulation of standards of practice such as the quality of data
interpretation and access to appropriate counselling.49,50 The
clinical value of WGES without medical indication remains
unproven as the presence of a statistically significant variant
does not mean that the person will be affected by this
particular disease. Private companies that are sometimes
based in different countries from where the tested person lives
may not have the same standards of counselling explaining the
meaning of the results.51 This is particularly challenging in the
prenatal context where the phenotype of the child is not yet
known. Furthermore, those accessing WGES privately may
expect the public healthcare provider such as the NHS to
support the interpretation of the test results and provide
further intervention on the basis of these results. The
interventions requested may not be in line with the healthcare
providers’ vision of good care and could put strain on an
already overloaded healthcare system.52
The future: is there a duty to have a healthy child?
Until recently, much of the ethical discussion about whether
there is anything resembling a duty to have a healthy child,
or at least a duty to avoid illness and disability where this is
possible, and what this might mean, has focussed on the
uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis. However, it is
likely as expertise and knowledge in both NIPT and genome
editing and/or prenatal gene therapy increase and converge
that questions about the responsibilities owed to future
children in the context of a developing pregnancy are going
to become matters for more mainstream discussion. For
some, these issues will be largely unproblematic: where
there is the potential to improve the health of a developing
pregnancy at no risk to the mother or fetus, there will be an
obligation to do so – a duty to ensure that any child has the best
life possible.53,54 For others, the possibility of such
interventions will raise broader issues about the value of
diversity, disability and questions about the importance of
avoiding overly reductive conceptualisations of the ‘good life’.
55–57. Malek53 suggests that there is a difference between the
wish to offer a child the best possible future and a
discriminatory attitude towards existing persons with
disabilities. Sparrow58 argues that the price of diversity carefully
needs to be balanced with the well-being of people. For others,
these will be tied to questions about whether any developing
child has a right to an open future and what this might mean?59
However, it might be argued by contrast that the right to an
open future argument does not only concern questions about
what parents should (not) do to their children but also what
they ought to offer their children.60
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have reviewed the literature relating to ethical
issues arising in the use of genomic approaches to prenatal
testing. Although there is a sizable literature onprenatal genetics,
that on genomics is rather more limited, suggesting the need for
further research in this area to provide an evidence base for the
development, implementation and evaluation ofmodels of good
ethical practice. Perhaps the single biggest difference between
genetics and genomics is likely to be the quantity and complexity
of data generated and with it a proportionate increase in the
challenges of analysis and interpretation and of translating this
into meaningful information of use to health professionals and
their patients. These challenges are amplified against the
background of increasing sophistication of non-invasive
approaches and of the growth of commercial providers of such
testing. It is our view that there is a pressing need for empirical
research on and rigorous analysis of the practical ethical issues
encountered by health professionals in the implementation of
prenatal genomics, and on the experiences of patients and
families. A further area in which more research would be
welcome is on the role and uses of commercial companies in this
space. There is a need for further discussion of the issues we have
outlined here, and we hope that this brief summary of ethical
arguments in the literature encourages researchers, clinicians,
patients and scientists to engage in further discussion of these
and other important issues raised by prenatal genomics.
WHAT’S ALREADY KNOWN ABOUT THIS TOPIC?
• There is a sizable literature on ethical issues in prenatal genetics.
Yet, there is only limited literature discussing these issues in the
particular context of prenatal genomics.
WHAT DOES THIS STUDY ADD?
• This literature review sheds light on the ethical issues in the particular
context of prenatal genomics.
• It shows the need for further research in this area to provide an
evidence base for the development, implementation and evaluation
of models of good ethical practice.
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